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The Legacy Of The Monetarist
Controversy
It is not quite true, as one (hostile) commentary
has asserted, that Monetarism was developed by
“Milton Friedman at the Federal Reserve Board
(sic) of St. Louis,” but it is nevertheless the case
that the intellectual environment created at this
Bank by Homer Jones ensured that the doctrine
took root and flourished here when it was very
much a minority taste elsewhere.1 And indeed,
at least two earlyand seminal contributions to
the Monetarist controversy, Andersen and Jor-
dan (1968) and of course Brunner (1968), which
gave the controversy its label, first appeared in
the Bank’s Review. The Monetarist controversy,
therefore, is surely a suitable topic for this lec-
ture. Now Monetarism has been much defined
and debated over the years, to the point at
which one may find authority for applying the
term to almost any economic andlor political
doctrine one likes, or more probably dislikes.
However, it is not so much my purpose here to
define that doctrine in detail yet again, as it is
to discuss the consequences for the develop-
ment of monetary economics, both in theory
and practice, of the debates to which it gave
rise during the 1960s and 1970s.
In this lecture, I shall first of all describe the
issues that were at stake at the outset of those
debates. I shall show that although the Mone-
tarist policy agenda was very different from
that of what we might call “Keynesian” ortho-
doxy, the positive differences in economic analy-
sis which underlay the policy debate were at
first empirical in nature, raising no fundamental
questions of economic theory. I shall also show,
however, that, whether it was logically necessary
or not, theoretical considerations of profound
importance did get introduced into the Mone-
tarist controversy as it progressed. Although
these at first seemed to strengthen the Mone-
tarist position, I shall go on to argue that these
very considerations in the longer run under-
mined it, leaving Monetarism without distinct
theoretical foundations, and incapable of coping
with the empirical difficulties which it began to
encounter from the mid-1970s onward. Further-
more, I shall suggest that most, though not all,
of those empirical problems stemmed from an
attempt by “Keynesian” orthodoxy to adapt Mon-
etarist ideas to its own use. Finally, I shall argue
that though the Monetarist controversy was to
all intents and purposes over by the early 1980s,
the problems which it bequeathed to monetary
economics continued to affect theoretical,
empirical- and policy-oriented aspects of the
sub-discipline into the 1980s, with results which
‘See Gould, Mills and Stewart (1981), p. 26.50
I cannot help but view with considerable
discomfort.
THE MONETARIST CONTR&
VERSE IN THE iSOOs
The Monetarist controversy concerned the
role played by monetary variables in general,
and the quantity of money in particular, in the
macroeconomy. Different exponents of Mone-
tarism stressed different propositions, but it
would be fair to say that, from the point of
view of the non-academic observer whose main
concern was the conduct of economic policy,
Monetarism involved first a theory of inflation,
second a theory of the cycle, and third, as a
corollary of these, a recommendation for the
conduct of monetary policy. Specifically, infla-
tion was said to be explicable in terms of the
rate of growth of the money supply, and the
cycle, or more precisely its turning points, in
terms of changes in that rate of growth. From
these propositions, it immediately seemed to
follow that both inflation and cycles could be
avoided by choosing an appropriate rate of
growth for the money supply, and binding the
monetary authorities to deliver it year in and
year out by imposing upon them some quasi-
constitutional rule of conduct, The central item
on the Monetarist policy agenda was thus to
eliminate inflation and stabilize the real economy
by taking discretionary power away from the
central bank.2
Whatever position may be taken about its
validity, this Monetarist agenda is nowadays
treated as having been (and perhaps as still be-
ing) worthy of serious discussion. It was not so
25 or 30 years ago. Then, though the Phillips
curve, about which I shall have more to say
below, was coming onto the scene, the predomi-
nant view treated inflation as largely a matter
of “cost-push” forces. The cycle was regarded as
having its roots in investment fluctuations, and
some mixture of wage-price guidelines and fiscal
measures was thought best able to cope with
the policy problems the two phenomena
presented. Monetary tools had at best a minor
role to play in the conduct of macro policy, and
the relevant variables were, in any event,
thought to be not the quantity of money, but
the level and structure of nominal interest
rates. In 1960, say, that as yet un-named body
of doctrine which we now know as Monetarism
was hardly debated for the simple reason that it
was regarded as quite outlandish. This was
strange indeed, because at that time no funda-
mental questions of economic theory separated
proponents of the conventional macroeconomic
wisdom of the early 1960s from their Monetarist
critics. Each side in the debate that was to
follow could, and did, derive their views from
specific quantitative hypotheses about relation-
ships embodied in what was, nevertheless, quali-
tatively speaking, essentially the same macroeco-
nomic model, that staple of the contemporary
textbooks, the Hicks-Hansen IS-LM framework,~
The first stage of the Monetarist controversy
was about the empirical nature and stability of
the demand for money function, or, as it was
then thought equivalently, the relationship deter-
mining money’s velocity of circulation. As early
as 1956, Friedman had advanced the hypothesis
that the demand for money was a stable func-
tion of a few arguments, and by 1959 had pro-
duced empirical evidence which seemed to
show that, as far as real money balances were
concerned, “few” meant “one”: namely, perma-
nent real income. The implications of this result
were startling, because, once fed into the IS-LM
framework, they suggested that if the quantity
of money was held to an appropriate constant
growth rate, there would be essentially no
scope for shocks originating on the real side of
the economy, for example, in the investment
component of aggregate demand, to bring about
any significant fluctuations in nominal income.
Nor would there be any role for fiscal measures
to play in influencing that variable, Further-
more, a slightly later, but essentially complemen-
tary, study by Friedman and Meiselman (1963)
2ln an earlier essay, Laidler (1982), Ch. 1., I analyzed the
essential characteristics of Monetarism from an academic
perspective, concentrating there on the role of a stable de-
mand for money function and the expectations-augmented
Phillips curve in defining the doctrine, As the reader will
see, these relationships play a large part in the following
discussion, and I regard this essay as supplementing
rather than in any way contradicting this earlier piece.
function, while Friedman (1971) also used it as an ex-
pository device. Note, however, that Brunner and Meltzer
(e.g., 1976), because of their insistence on the importance
of credit market effects in the generation ofthe money
supply, were led to extend this framework to a point at
which it became sufficiently different in its characteristics
to make it misleading to treat it as simply one more variant
on lS-LM.
3Thus Laidler (1969) used this framework to motivate its
discussion of the significance of the demand for moneyseemed to confirm directly the irrelevance of
variations in autonomous expenditure, while at
the same time attributing a considerable in-
fluence on money income’s behavior to the
growth rate of the money supply.
The appealing simplicity of these results did
not long survive further empirical investigation.
A number of studies soon found a role for inter-
est rates to play in influencing velocity, hence
re-opening the theoretical possibility of variables
other than money affecting the time path of
money income, and the Friedman-Meiselman re-
sults were not robust in the face of small
changes in the way in which the Keynesian con-
cepts of autonomous and induced expenditure
were measured.~Nevertheless, from a practical
point of view, the modifications to the basic
Monetarist position required by these results
were rather minor. The quantity of money did
seem to be an economic variable of potentially
strategic importance; and real shocks originating
in the private sector, not to mention impulses
coming from fiscal policy, did seem to play a
potentially less important role in determining
money income’s time path than the conventional
wisdom of about 1960 would have had it. By
1967 results such as these were sufficiently well
established and widely accepted that it was pos-
sible for the present writer to begin work on a
supplementary textbook (Laidler, 1969) which
summarized the empirical evidence on the de-
mand for money function, and explicitly inter-
preted it in terms of the above-mentioned IS-LM
model along just such lines as these.
Now the reader will be well aware that our
earlier confidence in the empirical stability of
the demand for money function has not been
entirely justified by subsequent experience. I will
take up this matter below. For the moment it is
more important to concentrate upon another
anomaly in this aspect of the Monetarist contro-
versy, namely that empirical evidence on the
stability of the demand for money function,
though relevant to Monetarist propositions
about the causative role of money vis I vis both
inflation and the cycle, and hence also to pro-
posals to tie down monetary policy by way of a
growth rate rule, stops far short of establishing
them. Thus, if monetary elements in the genera-
tion of inflation on the one hand, and the cycle
on the other, are to be discussed coherently, one
requires more than a link between the time path
of money and money income. One also needs a
theory of how fluctuations in money income are
divided up between its price level and real in-
come components. Moreover, a stable demand
for money function is quite compatible with the
existence of cost-push inflation and a cycle
whose origins lie in the private sector of the
economy, provided only that institutional ar-
rangements are such as to render the supply of
money as an essentially passive variable.
Empirical evidence about the stability of the
demand for money function, that is to say, got
Monetarist analysis taken seriously enough for
it to become controversial, but it could not in
and of itself guarantee its victory in a debate
which rather centered on the two issues raised
above. The first issue became known as the
problem of Friedman’s “missing equation,” and
debate about it overlapped heavily with discus-
sions of the “Philips curve,” otherwise known
as the “inflation-unemployment trade off.” As to
the second, it was addressed by such workers
as Philip Cagan (1965), and Brunner and Meltzer
(e.g., 1964, 1976) who opposed their findings to
the then “new view” of money propounded by
James Tobin (eg., 1969) and his associates. It
will be helpful to discuss these two aspects of
what we might term the second stage of the
Monetarist controversy in turn.
The problem of decomposing variations in
money income into their real and price level
components was a longstanding one in macroeco-
nomics, dating back at least to Hicks’ original
(1937) formulation of the IS-LM framework as a
model of the determination of money income.
Though subsequent developments of this system
reinterpreted it as dealing with real income,
that still left prices unexplained. Here, the usual
solution was to have them determined by the
behavior of the money wage, and as I have al-
ready noted, to treat the latter variable as being
driven by exogenous “cost-push” factors. How-
ever, this is not the whole story, for “demand-
pull” explanations of inflation also had their ad-
herents, and the Phillips (1958) curve relating
the rate of money wage inflation inversely to
4Among early papers finding a significant interest elasticity
of demand for money were Meltzer (1963) and Laidler
(1966). Both Ando and Modigliani (1965) and De Prano
and Mayer (1965) showed that fairly small changes in the
definition of “autonomous” expenditure led to rather large
effects on the assessment of its influence on aggregate
demand. Strangely enough, at this stage of the Monetarist
controversy, questions about vagueness in the definition of
money were not raised.52
the level of unemployment soon came to be
seen as a device for synthesizing these two
points of view. Wage inflation, according to the
Phillips curve was proximately caused by an ex-
cess demand for labor, for which variable the
unemployment rate was a proxy. Such excess
demand could either result from “pull” forces
shifting the labor demand curve, or “push” in-
fluences shifting the supply curve. In either
case, however, price inflation would be deter-
mined by the difference between wage inflation
and labor productivity growth. Hence there
seemed to exist a structural inverse trade-off
between inflation and unemployment, or equiva-
lently a positive relationship between the level
of real output and inflation.~
From the point of view of microeconomics,
the above analysis was fatally flawed, being
based on a theory which had the supply and de-
mand for labor determine the money, rather
than the real, wage, and it was not long before
Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968) indepen-
dently pointed this out. The latter, moreover,
brought his critique into the center of the Mon-
etarist controversy, by noting, first that the or-
thodox Phillips curve predicted that an inflation-
ary monetary policy could generate permanent
gains in real income, and second, that when its
underpinnings were corrected to take account
of the money wage-real wage distinction, the
inflation-unemployment trade-off was reduced
to a temporary phenomenon at most. Hence, a
key ingredient of the theory which yielded the
characteristic Monetarist propositions about
money growth affecting only prices in the long
run but quantities too, in the short run, was
created after the empirical observations upon
which those propositions were based had been
published, and turned out to be a theory not of
money, but of labor market behavior. It seemed
to be, moreover, in its original form, a modifica-
tion of a device borrowed from one branch of
the orthodoxy to which Monetarism was oppos-
ed. As a practical matter, rather than replace it
with some alternative equation, the Phelps-
Friedman critique of the Phillips curve simply
added the expected inflation rate to the relation-
ship’s right-hand side, with a coefficient of
unity.
As with Monetarist propositions about the de-
mand for money function, then, questions raised
by the Monetarist “correction” to the Phillips
curve seemed to be inherently empirical. Either
the labor force was immune to money ilusion
in the long run, so that there was no permanent
inflation-unemployment trade-off, or it was not,
in which case such a permanent trade-off ex-
isted. This question generated much empirical
work in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and it is
a fair generalization that as more and more evi-
dence was added by the passage of time, the
more the work in question came to support the
Monetarist position- Evidence from the 1950s
and early 1960s was compatible with the ex-
istence of an inflation-unemployment trade-off,
but the experience of higher inflation rates
from the mid-1960s onward made this hypothe-
sis harder and harder to support.6 Once again,
though, there was no reason why this result
could not be incorporated into the framework
of a suitably extended IS-LM model. However,
two factors militated against so simple and har-
monious an outcome to this stage of the Mone-
tarist controversy.
To begin with, the original Phelps-Friedman
critique of the Phillips curve had been advanced
on theoretical grounds, and before empirical
evidence seemed to require economists to change
their notions about labor market behavior.
When confronted with a choice between what
empirical evidence seemed to show, and what
elementary economic theory required to be the
case, Phelps and Friedman had chosen the lat-
ter. Ex-post, they were vindicated by empirical
evidence, and this vindication served notice on
macroeconomists that they would be wise to pay
more attention to the microeconomic foundations
of their empirical generalizations than had typi-
cally been the case up until then. Second, Fried-
man’s version of the critique had been accom-
panied by a brief account of labor market be-
havior, part of which was quite incompatible
with the then conventional interpretation of
real income and employment fluctuations as
manifestations of variations in excess demand in
the economy.
Phillips’ original analysis was much elaborated by Lipsey
(1960), but responsibility for explicitly treating the Phillips
curve as a structural relationship constraining policy
choice probably rests with Samuelson and Solow (1960).
6The relevant empirical literature was voluminous, but is
surveyed by Laidler and Parkin (1975).53
Conventionally enough by the standards of
the 1960s Friedman described the early stages
of the economy’s response to a monetary expan-
sion in the following terms.7
--.much or most of the rise in income will take the
form of an increase in output and employment
rather than in prices. People have been expecting
prices to be stable, and prices and wages have been
set for some time in thefuture on that basis. It takes
time for people to adjust to a new state of demand.
Producers will tend to react to the intitial expansion
in aggregate demand by increasing output, employees
by working longer hours, and the unemployed by
taking jobs now offered at former nominal wages.
This much is pretty standard doctrine. (p. 103, my
italics)
However, Friedman immediately went on to
elaborate this account of the mechanisms that
brought about short-term fluctuations in income
and employment:
Because the selling prices of products typically res-
pond to an unanticipated increase in nominal de-
mand faster than prices of factors of production, real
wages received have gone down—though real wages
anticipated by employees went up, since employees
implicitly evaluated the wages offered at the earlier
price level. Indeed, the simultaneous fall ex-post in
real wages to employers and rise er-ante in real
wages to employees is what enabled employment to
increase. (pp. 103-04)
Unemployment fluctuations in the conventional
view of the Phillips curve had been treated as
manifestations of variations in the pressure ex-
erted by excess demand in goods and labor
markets characterized by less-than-perfect price
flexibility, and hence likely to be operating out
of equilibrium in the wake of any shock to ag-
gregate demand. The first passage quoted above
is quite compatible with this view. In the second
passage quoted, however, employment fluctua-
tions are explicitly pictured as arising from vol-
untary decisions taken in response to price
changes and, in the case of the suppliers of
labor, on the basis of faulty expectations which
would in due course be corrected.
Thus Friedman’s critique of the Phillips curve
potentially involved much more than the addi-
tion of an extra variable to the right-hand side
of an equation. It also pointed toward a funda-
mental reinterpretation of the labor market
behavior underlying it. Viewed with hindsight,
it provides as an unmistakable sketch of the
microfoundations of the short-run aggregate
supply curve which was to become the central
analytic device of New-classical economics. As
we shall see below, this device would in due
course, and quite paradoxically, not strengthen
but thoroughly undermine the very Monetarist
explanation of the business cycle to which Fried-
man’s analysis of inflation-unemployment inter-
action was particularly addressed.
The analysis of inflation-unemployment inter-
action was by no means the only area in which,
during the 1950s and 1960s, macroeconomists
were seeking to strengthen the microeconomic
foundations of their analysis. A whole set of
questions concerning the determination of the
money supply, and the mechanisms whereby
monetary changes might interact with aggregate
demand in the economy, were also addressed in
such terms, both by adherents of the conven-
tional Keynesian macroeconomic wisdom of the
time, and by Monetarists. Here as elsewhere,
the contentious issues were more empirical than
theoretical. As Harry Johnson noted as early as
1962, there was no debate in principle between,
say, Brunner and Meltzer on the one hand and
James Tobin on the other about the basic nature
of the linkages between the monetary and real
sectors of the economy- Both saw these as in-
volving disturbances to the structure of the port-
folios of the banking system and the non-bank
public generating changes in the relative rates
of return on various assets, financial and real,
which would in turn provoke attempts on the
part of agents to restore equilibrium by way of
sales and purchases of various assets, Both sides
also agreed that financial institutions and the
non-bank public alike should be analyzed as
maximizing agents.
What defined the Monetarist position here
was not its general approach, but rather a set
of specific hypotheses about the quantitative
nature of the responses in question. First, as far
as the non-bank public was concerned, Mone-
tarists took a broad view of the array of assets
whose rates of return were relevant to what we
might term the transmission mechanism of mon-
etary policy. Specifically, they argued that mone-
tary policy would have effects not just on rates
of return borne by financial assets, but also on
the implicit rates of return yielded by producer
and consumer durables. Hence they saw its ef-
fects as being both more pervasive, and quanti-
references here and elsewhere to quotations from his work
are to this source unless otherwise noted.
‘Friedman’s (1969) Optimum Quantity of Money reprints
many of his seminal contributions, and the page54
tatively more significant too, than did proponents
of the Tobinesque “new view.” Furthermore,
while not denying that disturbances originating
in the private sector of the economy would im-
pinge upon the behavior of financial institu-
tions, so that the quantity of money was un-
doubtedly in this sense an endogenously deter-
mined variable, they nevertheless strongly re-
sisted the idea that the endogeneity in question
also involved that variable being passively
demand-determined, even when the monetary
authorities used short-term interest rates as
their policy instrument.
Such an outcome was logically possible, to be
sure. If interest rate changes disturbed only the
margin between financial assets (let us call them
bonds) and money, then a reduction, say, in in-
terest rates would lead to the public simply of-
fering bonds to the banks in exchange for mon-
ey with no further consequences. However, con-
sistent with their broad view of the range of
assets relevant to the transmission mechanism,
Brunner and Meltzer argued that the principal
margin likely to be disturbed by a change in in-
terest rates was that between bonds and
physical capital, including consumer durables.
The public would sell bonds to the banks, of
course, but as part of a process of replacing
those bonds with physical capital. Furthermore,
and crucially, this would be only a first-round
effect, for the sale of bonds to the banks would
be in exchange for newly created money which
would have to be accommodated in the port-
folios of the non-bank public. Since the banks
had presumably changed interest rates for a
reason in the first instance, the possibility of
their simply acquiescing in the destruction of
newly created cash by the public discharging
debts to them could be discounted. Hence, fur-
ther substitution effects, changes in aggregate
demand, and ultimately in the price level, would
be set in motion.
Monetarists’ theoretical position vis-â-vis the
behavior of the quantity of money in circula-
tion, then, may be described succinctly as fol-
lows. Rather than being a passive demand-deter-
mined variable, money also had a separate sup-
ply function which was derivable from analysis
of the interaction of banks and the public in the
market for bank credit. In turn, the quantity of
credit which banks were willing to grant, as
well as the terms on which they would make it
available, were both subject to a strong (though
not unique) influence flowing from the quantity
of reserves which the central bank made avail-
able to them. The quantity of money was an en-
dogenous variable, certainly, arising from a
complex set of interacting portfolio choices, but
it was nevertheless controllable by the
monetary authorities. This theoretical position,
moreover, was supported by a good deal of em-
pirical evidence, some yielded by formal
econometric studies, and some by less-formal
historical work to the effect that the behavior
of bank reserves, or more precisely of the quan-
tity of high-powered money, was the principal
determinant of the quantity of money in circula-
tion and that variations in the ratio of high-
powered money to the money supply proper
could be modeled as the outcome of systematic
maximizing portfolio choices.8
THE SUBVERSION OF MON&
TARISM BY NEW~CLASS1CAL
ECONOMICS
In the previous section of this essay, I have
described the main elements of Monetarist doc-
trine, and have tried to show that they were all
reasonably well-developed in the academic
literature by the end of the 1960s. However, it
took the inflationary experience of the early
1970s, particularly in the United States and
Britain, to draw popular attention to that doc-
trine by providing, during its early stages, some-
thing as close to a controlled experiment as one
ever gets in economics. In both countries, mone-
tary expansion preceded an inflation which the
authorities attributed to cost-push forces and
attempted to control with wage-price control
programs, and in both countries those programs
failed. Though the OPEC-led energy price in-
creases of 1973 contaminated the later stages of
the experiment by introducing an extraneous
cost-side impetus to the upward progress of
prices, the early 1970s was nevertheless the last
time that wage-price controls were deployed as
an alternative to monetary restraint in an anti-
inflation policy. Moreover, the fact that the high
Perhaps the best known of early econometric studies of
the money supply function is Brunner and Meltzer (1964).
The standard historical study is that of Cagan (1965).
Brunner’s (1968) St. Louis Review piece contains perhaps
his single best exposition of the Monetarist position on the
generation of the money supply, and of the characteristics
distinguishing it from the Tobinesque “new view.”55
inflation of the 1970s was combined with an
obvious deterioration in real economic perfor-
mance, rather than an improvement, ensured
that Monetarist ideas about the absence of a
long-run inflation-unemployment trade-off quick-
ly became conventional wisdom,
At the very time at which Monetarist ideas
were gaining popular acceptance, however, their
academic foundations began to shift dangerous-
ly as New-classical economics was developed. I
have suggested elsewhere that the work of
Robert E. Lucas, Thomas Sargent, Neil Wallace
and Robert Barro is more usefully treated as
separate and distinct from Monetarism, and for
what I still regard as good reasons.9 However,
this was and remains, something of a minority
viewpoint; and the fact remains that the two
central characteristics of New-classical econom-
ics, namely the interpretation of the Phillips
curve as a reflection of an aggregate supply rela-
tionship, and the rational expectations hypothe-
sis, were quickly adopted by leading Monetarists.
This was unfortunate, because as the Monetarist
controversy moved into the 1970s and 1980s, it
increasingly became, as a matter of fact, a con-
troversy about New-classical economics. The ma-
jority of economists failed to distinguish between
Monetarism and New-classical economics, and
accepted James Tobin’s characterization of New-
classical economics as Monetarism Mark 11.10
When New-classical economics was academically
discredited, so too was Monetarism in general,
leading to what, as I shall argue in the final sec-
tion of this paper, is a dangerous gap in the
structure of contemporary monetary economics.
I have already noted that Friedman’s 1968
analysis of the inflation-unemployment trade-off
relied on two incompatible theories of labor
market behavior. In the passages quoted earlier,
we had quantities moving instead of wages and
prices, which had already been set and hence
were unable immediately to change; and we
also had quantities moving in response to asym-
metrically perceived money-price changes. We
had, in short, both an informal account of the
effects of wage and price stickiness which was,
as Friedman said, “pretty standard doctrine” in
the macroeconomics of the 1960s; but we also
had an unmistakable sketch of an aggregate sup-
ply curve interpretation of the short-run Phillips
curve in which money-wage and price flexibility
was of the essence,
There is little point in speculating about the
extent to which Friedman was aware of the ten-
sions inherent in his analysis in 1968; but it is
interesting to note that, at that time, he charac-
terized Phillips’ work as “. - containing a basic
defect—the failure to distinguish between nomi-
nal wages and real wages (p. 102, Friedman’s
italics) whereas in 1975 he referred not only to
this point, but also attributed to Phillips an er-
ror in having “..taken the level of employment
[instead of the rate of change of prices] as the
independent variable. - “ in the relationship. By
1975 Friedman clearly was aware that there was
a choice to be made concerning the microeco-
nomic underpinnings of the Phillips curve and
had explicitly rejected that which hinged on in-
terpreting the unemployment rate as a proxy
variable for some excess demand for labor con-
cept. Brunner and Meltzer made a similar choice
concerning the modeling ofthe linkages between
output and price-level variations in designing
the basic framework which they and their asso-
ciates used to analyze the inflationary process
in a number of countries in the mid- 1970s.
Like Friedman too, they chose to model expecta-
tions as being formed not adaptively but, follow-
ing Lucas and Sargent and Wallace, rationally,
as the inflation forecast of the “true model” of
the economy under analysis.”
These developments seemed at the time to be
in no sense revolutionary. I have already re-
marked that the Phelps-Friedman critique of the
Phillips curve initially involved using simple mi-
croeconomic analysis to mount a theoretical at-
tack on what at the time seemed like an hypothe-
sis well-supported by empirical evidence; and in
the event, microeconomic principles proved a
sounder guide than what turned out to be some
misleadingly special observations. To show that
price-output interaction could be derived from a
supply and demand apparatus without resort to
purely empirical generalizations about price
stickiness, and to show that the analysis in ques-
9This argument is developed in some detail in Laidler
(1982), Ch. 1.
lOThis characterization of Tobin’s is developed and defend-
ed by him in Tobin (1981), in a paper prepared for the
same conference as the above mentioned Laidler (1982).
Ch. 1.
11The relevant work here is contained in Brunner and
Meltzer, eds. (1978). Note that the details of their formula-
tion of the aggregate supply curve, with output’s rate of
change rather than level playing a major role, set it apart
from the standard Lucas (e.g., 1973) formulation. These
matters, discussed by McCallum (1978), are not central to
the matter under discussion here.56
tion was compatible with agents making use of
“all available” information in a utility maximiz-
ing fashion, simply seemed to be making even
more secure the microeconomic foundations of
a particular piece of macroeconomics, and hence
to be rendering it less prone to excessive
dependence on theoretically unsupported em-
pirical observations of a type that had proved
so misleading in the recent past.
Also, and crucially, New-classical macroeconom-
ics still seemed to yield Monetarist implications,
namely that inflation in the long run was a mon-
etary phenomenon, and that, in the short run,
so was the cycle. To be sure, it broadened the
menu of monetary rules that would enable the
cycle to be avoided to any that the general pub-
lic could understand and therefore use as a basis
for expectations formation, but a constant
growth rate rule was still a particularly simple,
and therefore viable, item on the menu in ques-
tion, and it was of course a particularly appro-
priate choice if price stability in the long run
was added to the elimination of the cycle as a
proper goal for monetary policy.
Even in the mid-1970s, it should have been
apparent that the attempt to underpin the Mone-
tarist position with New-classical foundations
was dangerous. As early as 1958, Friedman had
suggested that monetary policy affected the
economy with a “long and variable” time lag.
The evidence with which he supported this sug-
gestion identified a change in monetary policy
as a change in the rate of growth of the quanti-
ty of money in the economy; and it showed that
downturns in that rate of growth occurred on
average 16 months before the corresponding
upper turning point of the cycle, while upturns
in money growth led cyclical troughs by about
twelve months, Furthermore, as Friedman
(1987) was later to note more explicitly, the ef-
fect of changed money growth on nominal
income’2
- typically shows up first in output and hardly at all
in prices. Ifthe rate of monetary growth increases
or decreases, the rate of growth of nominal income
and also of physical output tends to increase or de-
crease about six to nine months later, but the rate of
price rise is affected very little. the effect on prices
comes some 12 to tB months later...(p. 17)
In 1963, Friedman and Schwartz had presented
a more elaborate analysis of money’s role in
generating the cycle, in the course of which
they explained the length of the time lags in-
volved in terms that amounted to an informal
sketch of a dynamic version of the Monetarist
version of the transmission mechanism which
Brunner and Meltzer were also expounding at
the time.
The central element in the transmission mecha-
nism.--is the concept of cyclical fluctuations as the
outcome of balance sheet adjustments, as the effects
on flows of adjustments between desired and actual
stocks. It is this interconnection of stocks and flows
that stretches the effects of shocks out in time, pro-
duces a diffusion over different economic categories,
and gives rise to cyclical reaction mechanisms. The
stocks serve as buffers or shock absorbers of initial
changes in rates of flow, by expanding or contracting
from their “normal” or “natural” or “desired” state,
and then slowly alter other flows as holders try to
regain that state. (p234)
The empirical evidence referred to here, and
particularly that part of it dealing with the tim-
ing of output responses relative to those in
prices, and an explanation of that evidence in
terms of a transmission mechanism involving
portfolio disequilibria working themselves slow-
ly out over real historical time are quite incom-
patible with New-classical analysis. Since both
the evidence in question and the above explana-
tion of it were available and well established
before the development of New-classical ideas,
the incompatibility in question ought to have
prevented those ideas from being adopted as a
basis for Monetarist propositions, but it did not.
Whether this was because the problem was not
fully appreciated at the time, or because that
shift in methodological priorities away from em-
pirical evidence and toward “sound” theoretical
foundations upon which I have already com-
mented caused those who were aware of it to
opt for the latter is hard to say. I suspect that a
strong element of the latter consideration must
have been at work, though, since the inconsisten-
cy in question is hardly subtie)’
To begin with, the price flexibility postulate of
New-classical economics creates problems for the
“The reader’s attention is drawn to the recent (1987) vin-
tage of this statement. I have not been able to find so
clearcut and concise an exposition of the point in Fried-
man’s earlier work, though I believe that the basic message
contained in the passage quoted here can be distilled from
the evidence presented in Friedman (1969), Chs. 10-12.
“Though I do not claim to have understood this matter fully
from the outset, I did discuss it in some detail as early as
1978 in an essay reprinted as Chapter 4 of Laidler (1982).Monetarist account of the transmission me-
chanism. Slow adjustment of portfolios in the
wake of a monetary disturbance is of the very
essence here, and it is usual to explain the slow-
ness in question in terms of transactions costs.
But if the price level moves freely and instanta-
neously to keep markets cleared it also, in the
process, eliminates portfolio disequilibria quite
costlessly for agents. According to Friedman and
Schwartz, excessive money holdings develop be-
cause, when money growth increases, the rate
of inflation does not respond immediately. But
according to New-classical economics it does,
and so increased money growth cannot cause a
temporary rise in buffer-stocks of money as a
preliminary to increased expenditure flows. The
conflict here between traditional Monetarism
and New-classical analysis concerns rival theoret-
ical constructions. Much more serious is the
conflict between theory and evidence which
arises when the New-classical aggregate supply
curve is confronted with the empirical evidence
concerning the interaction of money, output
and prices over the course of the cycle, evidence
upon which traditional Monetarism laid con-
siderable stress.
As is well known, the New-classical aggregate
supply curve explanation of the decomposition
of nominal income changes into their real and
price-level components hinges upon the distinc-
tion between demand side shocks whose price
level effects can be anticipated by agents, and
those that cannot. The word “anticipated” nor-
mally means “expected and acted upon,” but
since the New-classical model is one in which
flexible prices always move costlessly and in-
stantly to equate supply and demand in all mar-
kets, the second phrase is redundant in its con-
text. If a price level change is anticipated by
agents, there will be no quantity changes associ-
ated with it; but if it is not, then the specific
money-price changes in particular markets that
are associated with it will be misinterpreted as
reflecting relative price changes and voluntary
responses in quantities of goods and services
supplied will occur. Cyclical fluctuations in real
variables may therefore be interpreted as the
consequence of unanticipated price level changes.
The trouble here is that it is hard to see how
output and employment fluctuations can be re-
sponses to price level fluctuations jf theyprecede
those price levelfluctuations; but the empirical
evidence tells us that they do just that.
This inconsistency of the timing of data with
the basic structure of New-classical theory, which
should have led monetarists to reject that theory
from the outset, did eventually undermine it. So
long as empirical work was confined to testing
the proposition that output and employment
fluctuations could be modeled as responses to
“unanticipated” money, all seemed well. How-
ever, Robert J. Barro (1978) noted that the theo-
ry in question made specific predictions about
the relationship between monetary shocks and
price level changes as well. When he came to
test the latter predictions, he found that, in
order to reconcile them with his data, the price
level’s response to unanticipated monetary shocks
had to be characterized by a rather slow-
moving distributed lag process, in an economy
in which, however, prices could respond with
no lag to anticipated money. Furthermore, his
results also seemed to require that the aggregate
demand for money display a greater sensitivity
to transitory than to permanent changes in in-
come, the very opposite result to that implied
by a wide variety of other studies. New-classical
analysis could be forced to fitthe data generated
by the U. S. economy, that is to say, only by
way of some extremely implausible subsidiary
assumptions.
Nor did the results of subsequent empirical
work enhance New-classical economics’ claim to
be taken seriously. Mishkin (1982) repeated Bar-
ro’s tests of the irrelevance of anticipated
monetary shocks for output using more sophisti-
cated econometric techniques, and found that
this resulted in a reversal of the initial results—
apparently anticipated monetary changes did
have real effects. Boschen and Grossman (1982)
noted that money supply estimates are published
weekly, and that only the errors in these esti-
mates properly can be regarded as constituting
the unanticipated component of the money sup-
ply. They further noted that the latter were im-
plausibly small to form the basis of a monetary
explanation of the cycle, and that output changes
were in fact correlated with monetary changes
about which information had previously been
published.
In addition to these problems raised by aca-
demic work, of course, there was the experience
of the early 1980s recession, which played the
same role in publicly discrediting New-classical
economics, as did the inflation of the 1970s in
undermining “Keynesian” theory. New-classical
economics discounted the importance of real
world wage and price rigidities, and placed con-
siderable faith, therefore, in the public’s will-
ingness to react immediately to a well-publicized66
anti-inflation policy based on monetary contrac-
tion in such a way as toreduce inflation without
serious real income and employment conse-
quences. The policies in question certainly did
reduce inflation, but the recession which accom-
panied that reduction was, in some respects, the
worst since the 1930s. Moreover, the United
Kingdom and Canada carried out similar experi-
ments at about the same time with similar
results. By the mid-1980s, the New-classical de-
velopment of the Monetarist account of the role
of money generating the business cycle was
thus widely recognized to have failed in its en-
counter with empirical evidence. This could
have led to a revival of interest in more tradi-
tional Monetarist analysis; but it did not, because
the very postulate that had established the re-
spectability of that analysis in the first place,
namely a stable aggregate demand for money
function, had also run into difficulties.
THE KEYNESIAN ADOPTION OF
THE STABLE DEMAND FOR
MONEY FUNCTION
The early studies of the aggregate demand for
money function, which established Monetarism’s
respectability, were carried out using long runs
of U-S- data, some stretching back into the 19th
century. Moreover, the data themselves were
highly time aggregated. Thus Friedman’s (1959)
seminal study covered the years 1869-1956, and
used cycle averages of variables in estimating its
basic equation. One business cycle, that is to
say, lasting on average about four years, provid-
ed one observation. Later studies, such as those
of Meltzer (1963) or Laidler (1966) dealt with
essentially the same time period, but used an-
nual observations. It was an obvious enough ex-
tension of such work to test the hypotheses at
stake in it against data drawn from other coun-
tries and also against more time disaggregated
data too, and such extension proceeded apace in
the 1960s mainly at the hands of people far
more interested in exploiting new data and com-
puting techniques than furthering any par-
ticular policy agenda.
At first the hypotheses in question—that the
demand for money varied with some real in-
come or wealth measure, some measure of the
opportunity cost of holding money, and in pro-
portion to the general price level—displayed
remarkable robustness; so much so that, by the
early 1970s, the demand for money function
was a prime candidate to become the center-
piece of stabilization policy, much as had the
Keynesian consumption function or the Phillips
curve at earlier times. For the demand for mon-
ey function’s full potential for such a use to be
exploited by policy makers, detailed knowledge
of the function’s contemporary form was ob-
viously needed, and in the early 1970s a remark-
ably simple version of the equation seemed to
be able to deal with quarterly U. S. data with a
high degree of precision. This relationship,
nowadays known as the “Goldfeld equation” after
its most careful exponent (Goldfeld, 1973), had
the long-run average value of money holdings
determined by real income and interest rates,
but involved the hypothesis that when some
disturbance took money holdings away from
this long-run average, they would move back
toward it slowly over time, with the speed of
adjustment in question being proportional to the
size of the gap to be closed.’~The Goldfeld
equation fitted U. S. data well, appeared to be
stable over time, and crucial for policy pur-
poses, dealt with data at a relatively low degree
of time aggregation. It did indeed appear to be
so policy relevant that, in his Presidential ad-
dress to the American Economic Association,
Franco Modigliani (1977) argued that it could,
and should be used as the basis of an activist
monetary stabilization policy in the Keynesian
mold.
Modigliani’s address in fact appeared after the
first signs of trouble with the relationship had
appeared. Before dealing with that, however, it
is worth reiterating that the progress of the de-
mand for money function so briefly dealt with
above was by no means synonymous with the
progress of Monetarism, but rather it involved a
component of Monetarism being taken over by
the Keynesian opposition. Just as the association
of Monetarist ideas about the cycle with those
of New-classical economics was to prove de-
structive, so too was this association, and once
more this could have been, but was not, dis-
cerned at the time in the light of evidence then
available. That the association in question was
indeed being formed was, of course, obvious
enough once Modigliani made the existence of a
“Though the relationship in question is now irrevocably
known as the “Goldfeld Equation,” it was in fact used
before him in studies of the demand for money by, among
others, Teigen (1964) and Chow (1966). Goldfeld, be it ex-
plicitly noted, did not claim originality for the relationship
in question.59
stable demand for money function an important
part of the basis of his case for monetary fine-
tuning, a policy stance to which Monetarism
was root and branch opposed; and I am not
here claiming otherwise. However, I am also
claiming that the equation fitted by Goldfeld,
and the interpretation he put upon it, were
quite antithetical to earlier Monetarist ideas
about the demand for money function in par-
ticular, and the role of money in the economy
in general.
To begin with, the demand for money func-
tion for which Friedman had initially claimed
stability was the “long run” relationship. In 1959
he had tested it against cycle average data,
among other reasons, in order to abstract from
the complex interactions among money, output,
prices and interest rates that characterized the
cycle, and which would tend to obscure the
underlying stability of the relationship in ques-
tion. Nor was such a procedure a quirk of one
particular paper: the empirical work of Fried-
man and Schwartz’s Monetary Trends.,., though
not published until 1982, was largely completed
in the late 1960s and was based upon cycle
phase average data. The apparent stability of
demand for money functions such as Goldfeld’s,
which used quarterly data and hence were
dominated by within-cycle interactions among
variables, should have been a source of puzzle-
ment to Monetarists, therefore, not of
satisfaction.
Monetarists should also have seen that
Goldfeld’s interpretation of his equation ran
quite counter to their ideas about the transmis-
sion mechanism.” He used the money supply as
the dependent variable of his relationship, and
treated it as responding passively, albeit with a
distributed lag, to variations in the arguments of
his demand for money function. It is of the
very essence of the Monetarist view that there
exists a supply function of money that is in-
dependent of the demand function, and that the
interaction over time of the money supply, in-
come, interest rates and the price level involves
causation running predominantly, though not
uniquely, from money to the other variables.
Goldfeld’s work on the demand for money, and
many other studies in the same vein, were thus
based implicitly on the “new view” of the money
supply process discussed above, of which Brun-
ner (1968) had been so critical. And indeed, in
the 1970s, as central banks became interested in
controlling the time path of monetary aggre-
gates, their procedures involved measuring or
forecasting the values of all the right-hand-side
variables of a Goldfeld-style equation except the
interest rate, and then setting the latter in order
to achieve a value of the quantity of money
demanded equal to the money supply target.
Clearly such a procedure left no room for tak-
ing account of the subtle interactions among
markets for money, credit and equity that lay at
the heart of the Monetarist view of the matter.
Be that as it may, the stability of the Goldfeld
short-run demand for money function that
ought to have puzzled Monetarists did not last
long. By 1976 he was inviting his readers to
solve “The Case of the Missing Money,” while
by the early 1980s, a number of commentators
were contemplating an unexplained decline in
money’s velocity of circulation. i6 Nor were pro-
blems with the demand for money function a
uniquely American phenomenon; Canada and
the United Kingdom too had problems with bad-
ly behaved demand for money functions in the
same years; so did Australia and New Zealand a
little later; and this list is far from exhaustive.
There is little point here in attempting a survey
of the voluminous literature generated by these
events, Suffice it to say that a wide variety of
ad hoc explanations, often relying upon par-
ticular institutional changes were proposed, and
often (not always) proved fragile. The upshot
was that in the eyes of the majority of commen-
tators the postulate of a stable aggregate de-
mand for money function was discredited, and
along with it the very foundation of
Monetarism.
15The first sign ofdiscomfort about this matter that I can
find in my own writings appears on pp. 143-44 of the se-
cond (1977) edition of my Demand for Money, where I refer
to there being a fallacy of composition involved in pro-
ceeding from the individual to the market experiment when
analyzing adjustment processes in the demand for money
function. Chapter 2 of Laidler (1982) developed my doubts
about all this in much more detail.
recovery from the 1982 recession. Monetarists should not
have predicted renewed inflation then, because actual and
expected inflation fell dramatically in the preceding
downswing, and hence should have led to an increase in
the demand for real balances which could be met only by
a falling price level or a growing nominal money supply.
What ought to have been done, and what was done,
however, are different matters, and careless Monetarist
predictions at this time did help to discredit the doctrine. ‘SAnd this decline in velocity was associated with rapid
money growth failing to produce renewed inflation in the66
Of course this upshot was preposterous. The
stability that Monetarism had from the outset
attributed to the demand for money function
was long run in nature, and the relationships
that collapsed were short-run formulations,
espoused by Keynesian economists intent on
establishing a basis for a policy of monetary
fine-tuning. Moreover, those relationships were
based on a view of the money supply process
which Monetarists had vigorously opposed from
the earliest stages of the controversy. An alter-
native inference to be made from the collapse
of the empirical stability of short-run demand
for money functions from the mid-1970s on-
ward was that this was the result of their
failure to model the dynamic relations among
the quantity of money, interest rates, real in-
come and prices as the outcome of the interac-
tion of an independent supply of money func-
tion with the arguments of the demand func-
tion; that the problem stemmed not from in-
stability of the latter relationship at all, but
from the inability of simple single equation
distributed lag techniques to come to grips with
the dynamic complexities involved in the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
Those of us who advanced the latter explana-
tion, however, did not find much of a sym-
pathetic audience, even among Monetarists. No
doubt this was partly because we did not make
our case as clearly as we might have done. But
it was mainly because the case in question had
as a key component the notion that markets
failed to clear instantaneously in the manner
demanded by New-classical economics. Rather, it
was argued that the transmission mechanism
worked along the portfolio disequilibrium lines
sketched by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) in
the passage quoted on page 56- In the wake of
the success of the Phelps-Friedman critique of
the Phillips curve, Monetarism had come to at-
tach great importance to adhering to “sound”
microeconomic foundations, so much so that it
had, as we have seen, become intertwined with
New-classical economics; and New-classical eco-
nomics was unable to tolerate such “disequilib-
rium” analysis.h7 As has already been noted, the
failure of New-classical business cycle theory in
the early 1980s was widely regarded as a failure
of the Monetarist view of the phenomenon; and
what I am now arguing isthat this same associa-
tion with New-classical ideas prevented Mone-
tarism from deploying its own earlier analysis
of the transmission mechanism as a defense
against an attack on another of its key compo-
nents. Empirical evidence about the instability
of the short-run demand for money function
ought not to have been interpreted as under-
mining Monetarist propositions about the stabili-
ty of the long-run relationship, but it was. By
the early 1980s, the Monetarist controversy was
over, with Monetarism discredited in the eyes
of most observers.
THE LEOACY OF THE
CONTROVERSY
The Monetarist controversy was concerned
with policy, but the issues involved in it did, at
the time, pose questions which defined a fron-
tier of academic research in monetary theory.
Furthermore, and again at the time, the latest in
econometric techniques were applied to the in-
vestigation of the empirical questions which the
controversy raised. There was nothing special
about all this. The Keynesian revolution too had
been simultaneously about theory, empirical
evidence and policy, and so had virtually every
previous debate in the history of monetary eco-
nomics. The end of the Monetarist controversy,
however, ushered in a period during which
monetary economics began to disintegrate into
relatively self-contained bodies of theoretical
work on the one hand and empirical policy-re-
lated work on the other. Whether this disinte-
gration is a temporary or permanent phenome-
non, only time will tell.
New-classical economics was underpinned by
a strong methodological preference on the part
of its exponents for grounding macroeconomic
theorizing on explicit microeconomic founda-
tions. Such foundations, however, are capable
of yielding a wider variety of macro models
than the monetary explanations of the business
cycle that lay at the heart of the work of Lucas
and Sargent and Wallace - Thus the empirical
failure of those models did not lead to the aban-
‘7Some of the problem here stemmed from semantics. If
“disequilibrium” behavior is read as synonymous with
“unplanned” behavior, then it is understandable that an
economist would not wish to rely on it in constructing an
economic model. If it means merely behavior incompatible
with the existence of continuous competitive equilibrium in
all markets, then it is surely more acceptable. The fact re-
mains that those of us who used it in the latter sense were
read as using it in the former, and were not sufficiently
careful to explain ourselves. The result was a considerable
amount of unconstructive debate and confusion among
Monetarists.61
donment of the methodological agenda which
had produced them, but merely to an attempt
to replace them with an alternative explanation
of the cycle with equally well, or even better,
defined micro premises. I refer here to that
body of research known as “real business cycle
theory” which is based on a stochastic version
of the New-classical growth model of Meade,
Swan and Solow, and attributes cyclical fluctua-
tions to exogenous shocks to the aggregate pro-
duction function, in much the same way as,
over a century ago, Jevons attributed the cycle
to fluctuations in agricultural productivity
associated with sunspot activity.
The exponents of real-business cycle theory,
though hostile to econometric testing, neverthe-
less do not ignore empirical evidence, and have
begun to address the question why, if it is not a
causative factor in cyclical fluctuations, there
are nevertheless systematic relations among the
quantity of money and other variables. The
very manner in which the question is posed vir-
tually dictates the answer offered, namely that
the relations in question are the result of
reverse causation running from the cycle to
money, rather than vice versa. Thus, in what is
surely one of the greater ironies in the recent
history of economics, a research agenda which
is widely regarded as a direct descendant of the
Monetarism of the 1960s has ended up adopting
a view of the role of money in the economy di-
rectly opposed to that of its intellectual antece-
dent, and virtually identical to that of the most
extreme form of “post-Keynesian” economics.”
This is no accident, for a view of the world
which has markets functioning perfectly and
without friction leaves no more room for money
to play an important role than does a view in
which markets do not function at all.
Though one important group among the aca-
demic heirs of Monetarism has thus systematical-
ly adopted hypotheses that downgrade the im-
portance of monetary phenomena, and has also
abandoned traditional econometric methods as a
basis for empirical research, this does not mean
that econometric work on monetary economics
ceased in the early 1980s. On the contrary, a
diverse body of contributors, including unrepen-
tantly old-fashioned Monetarists, econometri-
cians in search of an area in which to try out
new techniques, not to mention economists as-
sociated with central banks in various countries
which do, after all, still have to carry out mone-
tary policy regardless of the state of academic
opinion concerning its importance, have gener-
ated an extensive empirical literature on the de-
mand for money function during the 1980s. The
literature in question has been lively and, as I
shall now argue, productive in two lines of
inquiry.
First, questions arising from the fact of in-
stitutional change in the monetary sector have
been examined using both historical and con-
temporary data. In both cases, this phenomenon
has been found to be sometimes important. Thus
Bordo and Jonung (1987), using data going back
to the 19th century for five countries, have
shown that the slow decline in velocity which
occurred largely before the first world war
seems to have been associated with the increas-
ing degree of monetization of the economies in-
volved, and its later rise with the increasing ef-
ficiency of monetary exchange. Closer to our
own time, the sharp increase in the velocity of
Ml balances in Canada that occurred at the
turn of the I980s has been shown, beyond
reasonable doubt, to have been associated with
the simultaneous spread of daily interest check-
ing accounts. As to the United States, the work
of Barnett (eg., 1990) using Divisia aggregates,
provides evidence that various instances of
financial deregulation have produced shifts in
the demand for more conventionally measured
aggregates; while the very fact that it proved
necessary not so long ago to redefine those ag-
gregates is itself testimony to the importance of
institutional developments.
The other line of inquiry to which I refer
above has involved the application of far more
sophisticated techniques than were previously
available, both to the explicit modeling of the
so-called short-run demand for money function,
and closely related, to the task of extracting in-
formation about the underlying long-run rela-
tionship from data with a high degree of time
disaggregation. Here the results have been quite
startling. Short-run dynamics dominate quarter-
ly data and have to be modeled with a great
deal more care than exponents of, say, the
Goldfeld equation brought to bear or, given the
state of econometric technique, could have been
expected to bring to bear, on the task. Never-
181 refer here to King and Plosser (1984) which uses a form
of the old “money-income-causes-money” hypothesis to
reconcile monetary phenomena with a productivity-shock
theory of fluctuations in real variables.62
theless, once this is done, stable long-run rela-
tionships, very much like those which were first
estimated by Friedman (1959), Meltzer (1963) or
Laidler (1966), are after all to be found buried
in those data. This same result emerges with
powerful simplicity from a recent “low-tech”
study by Robert E. Lucas (1988), who shows
that data for the last 25 years or so of United
States history are still scattered (albeit widely,
and with complex serial correlation) around a
velocity function directly derived from Meltzer’s
(1963) estimates of the long-run demand for
money. Nor are results of this sort confined to
the United States. Similar conclusions arise
when British, Canadian or Japanese data are
analyzed.
As yet, this empirical evidence has not at-
tracted the academic attention it deserves, large-
ly, I suspect, because the treatment of the
short-run dynamics in the studies which
generate it has been based more on econometric
technique than economic theory. Exponents of
the so-called “buffer-stock” approach to model-
ing the demand for money, who have of course
followed up the analysis of the transmission
mechanism of Brunner and Meltzer as well as
Friedman and Schwartz, have tried to bridge
this gap. They have tended to ground their ex-
plicit analysis on rather simple special cases,
however, which have not proved empirically
robust; and this in turn has led to an identifica-
tion of the general approach with those special
cases and a tendency to dismiss prematurely the
broad insight which it yields: namely that the
dynamics of what we have learned to call the
short-run demand for money function are not
the property of a structural relationship at all,
but rather reflect that complex interaction of
the quantity of money with other variables to
which the Monetarists of the 1950s and 1960s
used to refer as a transmission mechanism sub-
ject to long and variable lags.’°
The Monetarist controversy was about theory
and empirical evidence, to be sure, but it was
also about monetary policy; and here it has left
its strongest mark. To begin with, the idea that
inflation is fundamentally a monetary phenome-
non, so outlandish in the 1950s, has by now
become something close to conventional wisdom.
We nowadays hear very little about cost-push
forces and the need to control them with wage
and price guidelines, controls and so on. Closely
related, central banks routinely pay attention to
the behavior of monetary aggregates in design-
ing their anti-inflation policies. Though even
such hard-core Monetarists as Brunner and
Meltzer (1987) no longer argue that the domi-
nant impulse driving the business cycle is always
the quantity of money, neither they, nor the
practitioners of monetary policy, have shown
the slightest sign of taking the productivity shock
hypothesis of the real business cycle theorists
seriously.20 Rather, the exclusively monetary inter-
pretation of the cycle has been replaced by an
eclectic approach in which monetary factors
have an always potentially important, and some-
times an actually important, role to play. That is
why the pursuit of price stability by monetary
means is tempered by caution concerning the
short-term costs that could be incurred if the
pursuit in question was to become too vigorous.
And eclecticism about the causes of cyclical in-
stability has not been accompanied by a revival
of interest in the use of fiscal policy for stabili-
zation purposes—though this probably has as
much to do with the fiscal deficits that are the
legacy of supply-side economics as with any les-
sons learned during the Monetarist controversy
itself,
A superficial reading of the above record
might suggest that, whatever its academic stand-
ing, Monetarism is alive and well in policy cir-
cles. That it has left a lasting mark in those cir-
cles is beyond doubt, but its success on the poli-
cy front has been far from complete. Indeed, on
one interpretation of the evidence, Monetarism’s
partial success here may have been worse than
failure. The Monetarist agenda, after all, involved
establishing the importance of the quantity of
money as a policy variable as a preliminary step
to removingfrom the monetary authorities their
discretionary control over it; and the record
19For an informal but more complete exposition of the
arguments involved here, see Laidler (1987). One of the
better known pioneering special case empirical formula-
tions of the approach is that of Carr and Darby (1981),
who refer to it as a “shock-absorber” approach.
20Let it be clear, however, that I do not regard “real
business cycle theory” as a total waste of time, and that I
do think it merits policymakers’ attention. Though I find it
hard to believe that shocks to technology will turn out to
be the sole or even main source of real world cyclical fluc-
tuations, it is nevertheless the case that, from a theoretical
point of view, such shocks as do originate in such
phenomena are likely to be welfare improving. The
valuable message of real business cycle theory, then, is
that we should not take it for granted that stabilizing the
cycle is always and everywhere desirable. It might not be
in particular instances. That reminder is surely worth
having.$3
shows that only this preliminary step was com-
pleted. Monetary policy plays a far more impor-
tant role in macroeconomic affairs now than it
did 30 years ago, but those in control of it have,
as a result, much more power than previously,
not less, as the Monetarist agenda intended.
This cannot really be helped, because part of
the academic legacy of the Monetarist con-
troversy has been a greater appreciation of the
role of institutional change in influencing veloci-
ty’s long-run behavior; but once that role is ad-
mitted, the case for tying down monetary policy
with rules becomes far more difficult, perhaps
impossible, to make.
All this, though, poses a challenge. If monetary
policy cannot be tied down by rules, then the
next-best solution is to subject it to the discipline
of constant public scrutiny and criticism. Aca-
demic economics has a large role to play here,
in providing the intellectual basis for such ac-
tivity, but at the moment it is not in good condi-
tion to do so. We do have, as I have noted
above, a large and growing body of empirical
work which points to the long-run stability (not
constancy, note) of money’s velocity, institution-
al change notwithstanding. That same body of
work, however, tells us that the short-run dy-
namics of that function are at least as complex
as anyone thought they were 30 years ago; and
we are no further forward now than we were
then in understanding just why this is the case.
At the same time, the gap between theoretical
work on the role of money in the economy, and
our empirical knowledge in the area, which was
opened up when the Monetarist controversy
became a debate about New-classical economics
and began to pay more attention to microfoun-
dations than to data, still remains. Intellectual
vacuums of this sort rarely remain unfilled for
long, but until this one attracts more attention
than it has to date, the Monetarist controversy’s
legacy must be judged to be a distinctly uncom-
fortable one. The controversy weakened the
links between academic research and contem-
porary policy which in the past made such re-
search a natural source of constraining criticism
of the conduct of policy, while simultaneously
enhancing the discretionary powers of policy
makers. ‘I’hat is hardly what its participants
intended.
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